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Securitization and lending standards: 
Evidence from the wholesale loan market 
 
 
Abstract: We investigate the effect of securitization activity on banks’ lending standards using 
evidence from pricing behavior on the syndicated loan market. We find that banks more active 
at originating asset-backed securities are also more aggressive on their loan pricing practices. 
This suggests that securitization activity lead to laxer credit standards. Macroeconomic factors 
also play a large role explaining the impact of securitization activity on bank lending standards: 
banks  more active in the securitization markets loosened  more aggressively their lending 
standards in the run up to the recent financial crisis but also tightened more strongly during 
the crisis period. As a continuum of this paper we are examining whether individual loans that 
are eventually securitized  are priced more aggressively by using unique European data  on 
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Executive Summary 
 
In the wake of the largest financial crisis in recent times many causes have been put forward. 
In particular, securitization  has been under scrutiny for fuelling credit growth by banks, 
possibly lowering credit standards and rendering the financial system more fragile to liquidity 
shocks. Traditional securitization can be broadly defined as the process whereby individual 
bank loans and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities, which are 
then sold on to investors. The development of the securitization market in the euro area 
started in the second half of 1990s and evolved to become a major funding instrument in the 
run up to the financial crisis. The advent  of  securitization  changed banks’ role and their 
incentives to take on new risks, in particular, via the possible impact of securitization on banks’ 
screening  incentives.  In this regard,  securitization  could have undermined  banks’  lending 
standards.  
In this paper we explore the link between securitization and lending standards by examining 
the pricing behavior of European banks involved in the securitization market when extending 
credit. Using evidence from the syndicated loan market, we specifically test if banks more 
active  at  originating asset-backed-securities,  priced  credit risk more aggressively  when 
extending new loans (i.e. grant credit at lower yields). This approach has the advantage of 
examining banks’ lending standards with first hand information from their primary activity of 
lending, while accounting for bank, borrower and instrument detailed conditions. This should, 
in turn, give an indication of banks’ changes in their risk-taking profile. 
We find that banks more active in originating securitised assets are also more inclined to relax 
(i.e. lower) their pricing of credit risk when extending new loans. The aggressiveness in pricing 
behaviour related to securitization is more noticeable for the smaller loans. Pricing standards 
also change over the business cycle: during an expansionary period, banks more active on 
funding via securitization are also more likely to relax their pricing standards probably relying 
on the possibility of offloading these loans through the financial markets. In this respect, banks 
priced credit risk very aggressively in the run up to the recent financial crisis. On the other 
hand, during an economic slowdown banks become more cautious on their pricing. Compared 
to their peers, banks more active in the securitization market during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis were charging higher spread.   4 
1.  Introduction 
In the wake of the largest financial crisis in recent times many causes have been proposed for 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis. At the centre of the argument is banks’ excessive risk-taking 
behavior, especially through abundant lending, over-leveraging and dramatic expansion in the 
usage of credit transfer products in the years leading up to the crisis. Securitization, albeit not 
new to the banking business, has been under scrutiny too for fuelling credit growth by banks, 
lowering banks’ credit standards and creating a false sense of diversification of risks (Shin, 
2009).  
Traditional securitization can be broadly defined as the process whereby individual 
bank loans and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities, which are 
then sold on to investors. In contrast to the US experience, where securitization in a narrow 
sense  has been used as a technique for more  than fifty years,  the development of the 
securitization  market in the euro area started much later and  was not triggered by the 
introduction of any specific government agency.
1
 
 The public euro-denominated securitization 
markets started timidly in the late 1990s, accelerated strongly from 2004 to 2007 and declined 
abruptly afterwards. Securitization activity in the euro area has also been large in terms of total 
credit securitized (see Figures 1.a and 1.b). In 2006, for instance, the annual net flow of euro-
denominated asset-backed-securities (ABS) was above one-fifth of the bank loans granted to 
households and non-financial corporations during that year (Marques-Ibanez and Scheicher, 
2010).  
<Insert Figure 1.a Euro-denominated securitization activity in Europe> 
 
<Insert Figure 1.b Securitization and retained activity in the euro area> 
 
Rapid developments  in  securitization  markets  altered banks’  role. Banks have long 
been  recognized  as “special” because of their ability to act as intermediaries between 
borrowers and depositors and transform illiquid  assets  into  liquid  deposit contracts. 
                                            
1 In the United States the market for ABS started to develop by means of government-sponsored agencies such as the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Freddie Mac, created in 1938 and 1968, 
respectively. These agencies enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and guaranteeing, but not originating, ABS.  
   5 
Conventionally, bank lending was typically conducted on the basis of a bank extending a loan 
to a borrower, holding the loan on their balance sheet until maturity and monitoring the 
borrower’s performance along the way. In this relationship-based model,  banks reduced 
idiosyncratic risks mainly through portfolio diversification and performed the role of delegated 
monitors on behalf of less informed investors (Diamond, 1984, Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 
1984, Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).   
Securitization allowed banks to turn traditionally illiquid claims (overwhelmingly in the 
form of bank loans) into marketable securities. The development of securitization has allowed 
banks to off-load part of their credit exposure to outside investors thereby lowering regulatory 
pressures on capital requirements, raise new funds and increase lending further. Overall the 
advent of securitization changed banks’ role dramatically from traditional relationship-based 
lending to originators and distributors of loans and had implications on bank’s incentives to 
take on new risks. 
Prior to the recent global financial crisis, the usual view at the time emphasized the 
positive role played by securitization in dispersing credit risk thereby enhancing the resilience 
of the financial system (Shin, 2009). Alan Greenspan (2005) highlighted that the use of credit 
risk transfer instruments enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks to divest themselves 
of credit risk by passing it to institutions with far less leverage. As a result, it was expected that 
securitization  activity would make the financial system  more stable as risk is diversified, 
managed  and allocated economy-wide. From the perspective of individual institutions 
securitization  was expected to be employed  by banks to manage their credit  risk more 
effectively.  Even if the total risk remained  within the banking sector, securitization  was 
expected to allow banks to hold less risk simply due to diversification and more tradability 
(Duffie, 2008).  
In this direction, early empirical evidence found a positive effect of securitization on 
banks’ risk levels. Banks more active in the securitization market were also found to have lower 
solvency risk and higher profitability (Duffee and Zhou, 2001, Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004, 
Jiangli, Pritsker and Raupach, 2007).     6 
At the same time there were concerns regarding the possible impact of securitization 
on the screening and monitoring incentives of banks. In particular for those - legacy - loans 
which were no longer on the balance sheet of the originated bank but were passed through to 
outside investors. Mostly building on this argument, there was a more skeptical view on the 
benefits of securitization  and  its  possible negative impact on the  stability of the financial 
system.
2
We explore the link between securitization and lending standards by examining the 
pricing behavior of European banks involved in the securitization market when extending 
credit. We turn to evidence from the syndicated loan market
 It was argued that securitization does not necessarily lead to credit risk diversification, 
but could promote the retention of risky loans and undermine banks’ monitoring incentives 
(Greenbaum and Thankor, 1987; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; DeMarzo, 2005; Instefjord, 
2005; Morrison, 2005; Krahnen and Wilde, 2006; Parlour and Guillaume, 2008; Chiesa, 2008; 
Shin, 2009). A related view argues that by making illiquid loans liquid securitization could 
enhance, other things being equal, banks’ risk appetite (Calem and LaCour, 2003; Ambrose et 
al., 2005; Hansel and Krahnen, 2007; Wagner, 2007; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2009).    
3
                                            
2  Financial stability is defined as a condition in which the financial system –  which comprises financial 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unraveling of 
financial imbalances (ECB 2010). From this perspective if securitization activity leads to excessively lax lending 
standards by banks’ it could have an impact on the overall financial stability by building up imbalances on credit 
markets that can make the overall system more fragile. 
 and specifically test if banks 
more active in the securitization market price credit risk more aggressively (i.e. grant credit at 
lower yields). This approach has the advantage of examining banks’ lending standards with first 
hand information from their primary activity of lending, taking into account bank, borrower 
and instrument conditions. This, in turn, gives an indication of banks’ changes in risk taking 
appetite. On top of the results presented in this study, we are currently expanding the scope of 
the paper. Namely we are collecting deal level information from European trustees which 
3 Syndicated lending, where two or more banks agree jointly to make a loan, has evolved into one of the world’s 
largest financial markets. In 2007, $3.4 trillion were raised using this instrument, amounting to one third of all 
funds raised internationally, including bond and equity issuance. In a typical syndicated loan, “arranger” (or 
“senior”) banks are situated at the core of the process. They help to put together the deal at a given set of terms 
and sell parts of the loan to “participant” (or “junior”) second tier banks, as well as other investors, assigning 
some of the loan to themselves. Participant banks do not normally negotiate directly with the borrowing firm, but 
rather have an “arm’s-length” relationship acting through the arranger (Sufi, 2007). The composition and 
structure of the syndicate can have an influence on loan pricing. In a bilateral loan the price is determined by a 
single lender depending on its information set about the risk of the borrower and the loan terms and conditions. 
In syndicated lending, the price of the loan is determined by negotiations between the arranger and the participant 
banks.     7 
allow us to distinguishing those syndicated loan deals that were eventually securitized. Using 
this data we aim to examine further whether securitized loans are priced more aggressively by 
banks. 
We utilize a set of four alternative variables to proxy for securitization activity at the 
bank level. Subsequently, we match this bank level information with deal level data from the 
syndicated loan market amounting to 20,830  syndicated loan deals/bank matched 
observations. We gauge the impact of European banks’ securitization activity on loan spreads 
by controlling for other factors such as bank characteristics, loan terms and purpose, borrower 
credit quality and business sector as well as the macroeconomic environment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on the effects of securitization on lending standards and risk-taking behavior. Section 
3 describes the data sources, provides descriptive statistics and explains the empirical 
methodology used in the analysis. The results of estimations are presented and discussed in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review 
Securitization  has significantly changed the liquidity transformation role traditionally 
performed by banks. The changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to “originate, 
repackage and sell” has made large parts of previously illiquid loans potentially liquid. Prior to 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the overall view was that securitization  lead to an overall 
improvement of financial stability by smoothing out the risks among many investors (Duffie, 
2008). Scant early empirical evidence also went in this direction. For instance Cebenoyan and 
Strahan (2004) find that through loan sales banks improve their ability to manage credit risk 
while  Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) argue that securitization  increase bank profitability and 
leverage while reducing overall insolvency risk. 
The crisis has shown, however, that the securitization market is heavily dependent on 
markets’ perceptions. It  could be subject, as a result,  to  sudden  illiquidity concerns  from 
investors leading to acute liquidity crises with significant macroeconomic implications.     8 
The theory of financial intermediation has placed special emphasis on the role of banks 
in monitoring and screening borrowers thereby mitigating moral hazard between borrowers 
and lenders (Diamond,  1984;  Fama 1985;  Boyd and Prescott,  1986).  By creating distance 
between  the  loan’s originator and the bearer of the loan’s default risk, securitization  can 
potentially reduce lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and monitor borrowers (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002). As a result some researchers associate loan sales and securitization to looser 
credit monitoring incentives by banks’ (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; 
Morrison, 2005; Chiesa, 2008).   
Initial empirical evidence from the recent crisis vouches for these results. Banks’ 
spectacular resort to securitization activity in the years preceding the crisis produced an overall 
loosening in lending standards (Keys et al., 2008). For example Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven 
(2008) link the current sub-prime mortgage crises to a sharp decline in lending standards in the 
United States. This decline was more intensive in areas where mortgage securitization was 
relatively more prevalent.  Supporting these findings,  Mian and Sufi (2009) showed that 
securitization drove the relative decline in the quality of mortgage credit. 
In order to signal the quality of the securitized assets and align its interests with those 
of investors, the originator of the assets may retain part of the equity tranche on its balance 
sheet. The objective is to lower asymmetries of information between originators and the final 
investor via the retention of the lowest ranked (e.g. equity) tranche. This retention, generally 
seen in practice, is the result of a signaling equilibrium where the securitizing bank, in an 
attempt to signal the value of assets, retains poorer quality assets (DeMarzo, 2005; Greenbaum 
and Thankor, 1987; Instefjord, 2005). Holders of senior tranches are exposed to sizable “tail 
risk”, i.e. the risk of very infrequent but catastrophic losses (Coval et al., 2009).  
Securitization also has a direct positive impact on the quantity of loans supplied by 
banks. Loutskina (2010) and Loutskina and Strahan (2009) find that securitization reduces 
banks’ holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Hirtle (2008) provides 
evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit 
for large term loans, with longer maturity and lower spreads, for newly negotiated loan 
extensions to large corporate borrowers. For Europe Altunbas et al. (2009) conclude that 
banks active in the securitization market also seem to supply more loans.      9 
While risk sharing within the financial sector (through securitization and derivatives 
contracts) reduces a number of market inefficiencies, it can also amplify bank risks also at the 
systemic level (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2010). Allen and Carletti (2007) show that credit 
risk transfer could produce a reduction in welfare due to contagion. Wagner (2007) shows that 
the increase in liquidity of bank assets achieved through securitization, paradoxically, increases 
banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures as banks have stronger 
incentives to take on new risks. The reason is that securitization makes crises less costly for 
banks and, as a result, they have an incentive to take on new risks offsetting the positive direct 
impact of securitization on bank stability. In sum, this strand of the literature argues that 
securitization does not necessarily lead to unlimited risk transfer but that it promotes retention 
of risky loans and undermines banks’ screening incentives. As a result, it may weaken financial 
stability. 
Part of the most recent empirical literature considers whether securitization activity 
makes further acquisition of risk more attractive for banks. In this direction, Krahnen and 
Wilde (2006) report an increase in the systemic risk of banks, after a securitization deal takes 
place, due to the retention of the first loss piece. Michalak and Uhde (2009) provide empirical 
evidence that credit risk securitization has a negative impact on banks’ financial soundness in 
Europe. Insterjord (2005) highlights that when a bank has access to a richer set of tools to 
manage risk than in the past; it acquires new risks more aggressively in. In this direction also, 
Hansel and Krahnen (2007) find that activity in the European CDO market enhances the risk 
appetite of the originating bank. 
Enhancement of risk appetite is also related to regulatory capital arbitrage. 
Securitization has often been used by banks to lower their regulatory needs for costly capital 
charges on their credit book (Watson and Carter, 2006). Through securitization banks can 
potentially increase regulatory capital adequacy ratios without decreasing their loan portfolios’ 
risk exposure. In other words, banks may securitize less risky loans and keep the riskier ones. 
Ambrose et al. (2005) show that securitized loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than 
those retained on banks’ balance sheet.     10 
3.  Methodology and data 
We analyze the link between securitization activity and lending standards. For each time period 
we consider banks’ securitization activity and then turn to evidence from the syndicated loan 
market and observe the price setting for each bank on newly extended loans (measured as the 
spread charged) as a measure of banks’ risk appetite. In other words, we examine if banks that 
securitize the most were more aggressive in their loans pricing. This allows us to investigate if 
banks active in the securitization market exhibited a laxer approach on the pricing of credit 
risk.   
In addition to the above we are currently extending the scope of our analysis. We will 
expand it by  including  deal level information on which syndicated  loans  were eventually 
securitized. This is done by means of a unique database constructed by collecting deal-by-deal 
information from all European trustees. This expansion of the data and analysis allow us to 
expand on the link between bank risk taking and securitization activity in an additional 
dimension as it will be possible to examine whether the loans which are eventually securitized 
are priced more aggressively than those that are not securitized.   
Our model explains loan spreads as a function of several factors (Carey and Nini, 2007; 
and Ivashina, 2009). Where Loan spread is measured as the spread on basis points over LIBOR. 
We use the all-in drawn spread (AIDS) which measures the interest rate spread plus any 
associated fees included at loan origination.
4
 
 Thus, AIDS is an all-inclusive measure of loan 
price which is expected to depend on borrowers, loan and macroeconomic characteristics as 
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We utilize a set of different variables to account for securitization activity by banks: 
                                            
4 See Bharath et al. (2010); Ivashina (2009) and Sufi (2007).   11 
1.  Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank i securitized any assets on the year t in which 
the loan i is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Sec_dum measures the immediate impact of 
bank’s securitization activity on loan pricing. 
2.  Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank i was active in the securitization market 
anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 otherwise. This variable serves to test whether, 
in general, banks that were more active in the securitization market priced loans more 
aggressively than others. 
3.  Sec_rel is the size of total securitization activity by bank i on the year when the loan is 
syndicated  divided by its  total assets.  Sec_rel  measures the immediate impact of 
securitization activity on loan pricing in relation to the bank’s securitization activity 
within each year t. 
4.  Sec_rel_tot is the total size of each bank i total securitization activity between 1994 and 
2008 divided by its average assets during this period. This measure aims to capture 
bank’s securitization activity over the whole sample period.   
5.  Loan_to_sec is calculated as the total amount of syndicated loans by bank i in period t 
divided by the overall amount of bank’s securitization activity within that year.    
We account for characteristics of bank i  that might affect the pricing behavior by taking into 
account bank size (measured as the natural logarithm of total assets)
5
We also control  for factors related to the terms of the loan deal  (i.e.  loan terms) 
including loan size, maturity  and the  presence of guarantees and collateral.  Loan size  is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the syndicated loan’s size. Maturity is the duration of the 
, bank capital (measured 
as the ratio of equity capital to total assets), banks’ portfolio quality (calculated as loan loss 
provision to total loans), banks’ profitability (return on assets), relative size of the loan portfolio (net 
loans to total assets), liquidity (liquid assets to total assets) and income diversification (other non-interest 
income to total income).  Banks with higher capital ratios, better portfolio quality, higher 
profitability and a larger, diversified loan portfolio are expected to charge lower prices. 
Direction of other bank characteristic variables is ambiguous. 
                                            
5 Banks and loan size are the only variables in the model that measured with actual size. As the size of banks and 
loans vary substantially, we use the natural logarithm of these variables to capture the relative impact on loan 
price.   12 
loan in years and measured by three dummy variables accounting for short-term (less than 3 
years), medium-term (between 3 and 6 years) and long-term (over 6 years) loans. Guarantee is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the loan is guaranteed and 0 otherwise. Collateral is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is any collateral pledged for the loan and 0 
otherwise.  Loan size and maturity are  expected to have a positive relationship with loan 
spreads. The expected sign for guarantees and collateral is ambiguous.     
Loan purpose is a set of dummy variables depending on the purpose of the loan which 
can be classified as general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, 
corporate control and property finance.   
We also account for borrower credit quality, and borrower sector via a set of dummy variables 
reflecting the credit rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C or not rated) of the 
borrower issued by the credit agencies (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s or Fitch) at the time of 
issuance.  Higher quality borrowers are expected to pay lower spreads for loans. 
Borrower  sector  is a set of dummy variables related to  the  main  business of the 
borrower (i.e. construction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related 
services, state, manufacturing and transport).  
We also control for the macro environment including Year dummies.
6
3.1  Data sources 
 Our data covers 
the period ranging from 1994 to 2008. 
We construct our dataset by combining data from three different sources. Securitization data 
are obtained from Dealogic  (Bondware)  which is a private  commercial data  provider  and 
completed with data from Standard and Poor’s (S&P), a large private rating agency. We look at 
individual deal-by-deal issuance patterns from euro-area banks originating the securities. The 
advantage of using data on securitization activity from Bondware and S&P is that the name of 
the originator, the date of issuance and deal proceeds are registered. We include funded public 
Asset-backed  securities as well as cash-flow (balance-sheet)  CDOs issued by euro-area 
originators. Overall the securitization dataset covers over 4,500 tranches. 
                                            
6 A correlation matrix is presented in Table 8.   13 
Data  on syndicated loan deals are also  obtained from Dealogic (Loanware), a 
commercial database which contains detailed information on syndicated loan contracts. 
Dealogic provides detailed information for each loan including maturity, loan size, collateral, 
presence of guarantees, loan purpose as well as the identification of the borrower and banks 
involved in the syndicate. The database also provides the business sector of the borrower and 
the credit rating attached to the issued instrument. Finally, bank balance-sheet and income 
statement information are obtained via Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by 
Bureau van Dijk.   
In constructing the dataset, we include all syndicated loans for which the main control 
variables on loan terms and borrower details are present. Secondly we extract the names of the 
European banks participating on these loan syndicates. This information is manually matched 
with  Bankscope  using the names of the parent institutions to extract  information on the 
financial balance sheet characteristics of each bank on a yearly basis. We then match each 
syndicated loan deal  with  each  participant banks’  financial information on a  yearly basis. 
Subsequently,  again  via the name of each participating bank,  we obtain the amount of 
securitization activity originated yearly for each bank from our sample on securitization activity 
at the deal level from Dealogic (Bondware)/Standard and Poor’s. For example if Loan i is 
granted by Bank X, Bank Y and Bank Z  in 2007 and Loan j is granted by Bank X and Bank Q in 
2008 then these combinations of loans and banks are matched as follows:  
 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank X’s data for 2007 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank Y’s data for 2007 
Loan i’s terms and borrower’s data for 2007 + Bank Z’s data for 2007 
Loan j’s terms and borrower’s data for 2008 + Bank X’s data for 2008 
Loan j’s terms and borrower’s data for 2008 + Bank Q’s data for 2008 
 
Overall this process generates  20,830  deal-matched observations. As the different data 
sources do not have a unique identifier to match the three databases, all the data is hand-
matched by the  bank names  of the parent institution.  We present a  summary descriptive 
statistics related to the sample in Table 1.   
   14 
4.  Results 
The results of the basic model are presented in Table 2. We employ separately the  four 
securitization activity variables in alternative models (Model I-IV). Across all the models we 
find  consistent  and significant  evidence suggesting that securitization  activity is  negatively 
related to loan spreads. The coefficient of sec_dum suggests that banks charge lower spreads if 
they  securitized  some  assets in the same year in which the loan is issued.  Findings  for 
sec_dum_all also confirm that when banks are active in the securitization market, at least once 
during our period of study,  they tend to  price  the credit risk  more  aggressively.  The 
coefficients of the two continuous variables  accounting for securitization,  sec_rel  and 
sec_rel_total, display the same relationship as the two previous (dummy) variables but with 
higher  impact  stressing the strength of the relationship. The coefficient of sec_rel, which 
measures the relative size of the securitized assets to total assets, is larger than the previous 
two variables. This reinforces the argument of securitization activity being linked to laxer credit 
standards by banks. Banks securitizing more assets tend to under-price even further when they 
extend new loans, perhaps with the confidence of knowing that the loans can be sold in the 
securitization market afterwards.     
4.1  Bank and loan size effects 
We control for banks’ size as larger banks might be able to diversify or manage their credit risk 
exposure better or simply because very large banks might be deemed as ‘too big to fail’ and 
therefore they might have incentives to take on additional risks. Hence we divide our sample 
into two groups according to size defined as large and small banks. Small banks are smaller than 
(or equal to) the median bank size (measured by total assets) and we classify as large banks those 
banks larger than the median bank in terms of size of their balance sheet. Results are displayed 
in Table 3. For each group,  we  separately  re-run  the  previous models incorporating  the 
different indicators accounting for securitization activity (small banks - Models I to IV and 
large banks - Models V to VIII). For small banks none of the coefficients accounting for 
securitization  activity are significant. In contrast, for large banks they are all consistently 
significant and negatively associated with the loan spread. Furthermore, the coefficients are 
larger than the results for the basic model, particularly for sec_rel (in Table 2). The findings   15 
show that larger banks heavily involved in the securitization activity are those more likely to 
relax their price standards on wholesale loans.  
  We further test whether the relaxation in lending standards due to securitization varies 
according to the size of the loan. We divide the sample into two groups defined as large and 
small loans. Small loans are those classified as smaller than (or equal to) the size of the median 
loan and large loans are classified as those loans larger in size than the median loan for each 
given year. All models (See Table 4, Model I to VIII)  report a significant and negative estimate 
for all the coefficients of the securitization proxies suggesting that loan size does not seem to 
make a difference on the signs of the coefficients relating pricing behavior to securitization. 
The sizes of the coefficients are however higher for smaller loans providing some evidence 
that, banks  under-price  smaller  loans  by more  as they are  probably more subject to 
asymmetries of information. In Model IX (Table 4), we employ both the size of loan relative to 
the size of banks total securitization activity (loan_to_sec) as well as the securitization activity 
dummy  sec_dum, to further  scrutinize the effect  of  loan size. The results  support earlier 
evidence suggesting that larger loans (in relation to total securitization) are less likely to be 
under priced.  
As large banks are more likely to price more aggressively, we go one step further and 
focus only on large banks and observe if their behavior changes depending on loan size (Table 
5).  Again the securitization variables suggest an impact on loan price which is statistically 
significant across all models. However, we report significantly higher coefficients for smaller 
loans (Models I to IV in Table 5). Banks active in the securitization market charge lower 
spreads to smaller loans than to larger ones.   
4.2  Business cycle and risk taking 
We also consider  whether  the link between  pricing  behavior  and  securitization  activities 
changes over the business cycle as lending standards probably change with macroeconomic 
conditions. In addition the impact of securitization on lending standards might change 
according to investors demand for securitized products and this demand is expected to be 
stronger during periods of economic growth (Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2008). To carry the 
analysis further, we divide the sample into four different periods according to macroeconomic   16 
conditions in Europe. We define the 1997-1999 and 2003-2006 as growth periods and the 
2000-2002 and 2007-2008 as slowdown periods. It is particularly important to observe bank 
behavior for the period prior to the recent credit crisis since banks increased their risk-taking 
behavior in many fronts, especially lowering their lending standards coinciding with increases 
in securitization activity in the years leading up to the crisis (Maddaloni and Peydro, 2010). 
Results are presented in Table 6.   
4.2.1  Growth periods 
For both of the growth periods we report negative and statistically significant coefficients 
across all models using alternative securitization  activity proxies. The results indicate that 
during expansionary period banks are more likely to under-price credit risk possibly linked to 
declines in risk aversion which coincided with periods of better economic prospects.  
Furthermore, coefficients for the variable sec_rel for both periods show that under-pricing is 
amplified when the value of securitized assets is larger. A notable difference between the two 
expansionary periods is the size of the coefficients of the securitization variables, which is 
much larger for the 2003-2006 period which was a period of historical growth of securitization 
markets in Europe. This signals that banks,  probably  relying  on  the possibility of future 
securitization, lowered their lending standards much more aggressively for the period prior to 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis than they did on the period preceding the previous economic 
slowdown (2001-2002).  The difference among  the two periods is  consistent with the 
development of the securitization market in the second one. The activity in the securitization 
market was moderate in Europe between 1997 and 1999 and not many banks were utilizing 
this market for offloading assets. However, after the economic slowdown of 2001-2002 public 
securitization activity soared and peaked towards the end of 2006. At the time, banks became 
more reliant on securitization of assets and probably under-priced loans with the confidence 
that loans can be sold to others in the securitization market.  
4.2.2  Economic slowdown and 2007-2008 period of financial crisis 
The results are substantially diverse for the previous economic slowdown compared to the 
most recent crisis period.  Firstly we find that, apart from sec_dum_all, the securitization activity   17 
variables are not significant for th 2000-2002 slowdown period. This is a period of overall 
tightening in credit standards (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). During an economic slowdown, 
banks, facing increases in non-performing loans and write-offs, keep a tight control and are 
overall more cautious on their lending practices. During this period there is no evidence 
suggesting that  banks involved in securitization activity relaxed credit standards by more 
probably because securitization market’s activity declined during this recession period.     
Findings for the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis  are  striking  as  compared with 
previous results we find a reverse relationship between securitization activity and lending 
standards. The sec_dum and sec_rel variables (which proxy the current securitization activity) are, 
unlike all other coefficients reported above, positively related to the loan price. These results 
point out that securitization seems to make lending standards more cyclical. In other words, in 
periods of slow economic growth in which demand for securitization from investors is 
subdued, banks active in the securitization market were charging higher spread for the loans 
they were extending thereby reverting the trend seen in periods of buoyant economic growth. 
4.3  Robustness checks for existence of credit rating 
Due to data limitations we cannot control for credit ratings for all borrowers. In this final 
section we check whether the basic results hold for those borrowers with and without credit 
ratings. The results are presented in Table 7. We find that the basic findings of the paper are 
consistent and that the main relationships hold for all securitization activity proxies. 
5.  Conclusions 
Securitization  has been under the scrutiny for  possibly  fuelling  credit  by lowering credit 
standards leading to increased banks’ and borrowers’ leverage (Farhi and Tirole, 2009 and 
Shin, 2009). We explore the nexus between securitization and bank risk-taking by examining 
the pricing behavior of European banks when extending new loans after securitization. We use 
a wide sample of 20,830 matched bank-loan observations to gauge the impact of European 
banks’ securitization activity on loan spreads after controlling for lender, borrower and loan 
characteristics.   
We consistently find that banks more active in securitization markets are more inclined 
to under-price the credit risk when extending new loans. The risk-taking behavior is more   18 
apparent in larger banks. That is the under-pricing intensifies for large institutions heavily 
involved in securitization activity. We also find that smaller loans are more likely to be under-
priced than larger ones.  
The pricing behavior also changes in relation to the business cycle. We find that during 
an expansionary  period  securitizing  banks are more likely to price  credit risk aggressively 
probably relying on expectations of their potential offloading of assets through securitization 
markets. This factor is amplified when the value of securitization activity as a percentage of 
banks’ total assets is large. Banks priced credit risk much more aggressively for the period prior 
to the 2007-2009  financial crisis than they did for the period preceding the 2001-2002 
economic slowdown which can be probably linked to the fast development of securitization in 
the latter period. On the other hand, during an economic slowdown banks (facing increases of 
non-performing loans and write-offs) tend to tight their lending standards. Banks, aware of a 
fall  of  investor interest in securitized assets during a recession, reduce their reliance on 
securitization markets and stop under-pricing credit risk. In fact, compared to their peers, 
banks active in the securitization market during the 2007-2009 financial crisis were charging 
higher spreads for the loans they were extending.  
From a policy perspective, an important implication is that that securitization could be 
increasing the cyclicality of credit. Our results suggest that banks more active in securitization 
activity  relaxed  credit standards above their peers during periods of economic expansion. 
Securitization could therefore be fuelling, under certain circumstances, excessive loan growth 
which could potentially have financial stability implications. Policy measures aiming at 
smoothing the credit cycle could be beneficial in this respect.  More generally, regulatory 
actions improving the incentive structure within the securitization market that reduces the 
incentives for under pricing credit risk are also warranted.   19 
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This table presents descriptive statistics. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets 
in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank 
was active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the size 
of banks total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is 
the size of banks total abs activity between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period. 
Loan_to_sec is the size of the loan divided by the size of banks total abs activity in the year where the 
loan is syndicated. 
Securitization variables 
  # of obs.  = 1  = 0   
Sec_dum  20,830  527  20,303   
Sec_dum_all  20,830  2588  18,242   
         
  # of obs.  >  0  0  mean 
Sec_rel  20,830  527  20,303  0.67 
Sec_rel_tot  20,830  2588  18,242  0.86 
Loan_to_sec   20,830  527  20,303  2.34 
         
Distribution of observations over time 
Year  % of sec_dum  % of sec_dum_all 
1994  0.0%  20.7% 
1995  0.0%  21.2% 
1996  0.0%  22.0% 
1997  1.7%  22.0% 
1998  0.0%  21.1% 
1999  13.9%  23.9% 
2000  3.3%  34.2% 
2001  4.5%  9.0% 
2002  4.3%  25.4% 
2003  5.2%  15.8% 
2004  5.2%  12.5% 
2005  1.4%  7.8% 
2006  1.4%  6.3% 
2007  2.8%  5.9% 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Descriptive statistics 
Bank characteristics 
  # of banks  mean   median   std. dev 
Bank size (million USD)  496  18,240  3,206  48,573 
Equity capital to total assets  496  8.2  6.0  8.5 
Loan loss provision to total loans  496  2.4  0.7  9.7 
Return on assets  496  0.49  0.37  1.01 
Net loans to total assets  496  38.9  37.2  22.3 
Liquid assets to total assets  496  55.3  55.4  22.9 
Other income to total income  496  13.9  10.7  18.0 
         
 
         
Loan characteristics 
  # of loans  mean   median   std. dev 
Spread (basis points  over Libor)  9,741  143  100  124 
Loan size  (million USD)  9,741  526  165  2261 
Maturity (years)  9,741  4.34  5  4.50 
         
  # of loans  = 1  = 0   
Presence of guarantees  9,741  868  8873   
Presence of collateral  9,741  2614  7127   
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Table 2 
Securitization activity and loan spreads 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization 
activity on the price of syndicated loans. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets in 
the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was 
active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the size of banks 
total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of 
banks total abs activity between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period.   
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV 
Sec_dum  -16.93***          
  (3.50)       
Sec_dum_all    -14.31***     
    (1.66)     
Sec_rel      -27.82***   
      (6.17)   
Sec_rel_tot        -17.45*** 
        (2.71) 
         
Number of obs.  20,830  20,830  20,830  20,830 
R
2  35%  35%  35%  35% 
       
Control Variables
‡       
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose –  general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport 
finance, corporate control and property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector – contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population 
related services, state, manufacturing and transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.   Year fixed effects – 1994 to 2008 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis         
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively     
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request   25 
 
Table 3 
Securitization activity and loan spreads by banks size 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated 
loans by bank size. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise.  
Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is 
the size of banks total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of banks total abs 
activity between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period. Small banks are classified as banks smaller than (or equal to) 
the median bank size (measured by total assets).  Large banks classified as banks larger than the median bank size (measured by total assets).  
Sec_dum equals to 1 in 170 observations for the small banks and in 355 observations for the large banks.  
  Small banks  Large banks 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
Sec_dum  3.93           -28.09***          
  (6.88)        (4.10)       
Sec_dum_all    1.48        -21.14***     
    (3.71)        (2.06)     
Sec_rel      -2.27        -60.12***   
      (8.79)        (8.52)   
Sec_rel_tot        3.61        -39.35*** 
        (4.09)        (3.87) 
                 
Num. of obs.  8,337  8,337  8,337  8,337  12,493  12,493  12,493  12,493 
R
2  32%  32%  32%  32%  39%  39%  39%  39% 
               
Control Variables
‡                 
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose –  general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, 
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector –  contraction and property, high-tech industry, 
infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and 
transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.   Year fixed effects – 1994 to 2008 
       
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis         
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively     
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request 
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Table 4 
Securitization activity and loan spreads by loan size 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans by 
loan size. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Loan_to_sec is the 
size of loan divided by the size of banks total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated. Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was 
active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the size of banks total abs activity in the year where the 
loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of banks total abs activity between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during 
this period. Small loans classified as loans smaller than (or equal to) the median loan size. Large loans classified as loans larger than the median loan 
size. 
  Small Loans  Large loans  All loans 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII  Model IX 
Sec_dum  -21.45***           -14.93***           -19.17*** 
  (6.43)        (3.14)        (3.62) 
Sec_dum_all    -19.70***        -12.12***       
    (3.01)        (1.65)       
Sec_rel      -38.39***        -22.95***     
      (11.98)        (6.26)     
Sec_rel_tot        -19.32***        -18.73***   
        (4.51)        (2.77)   
Loan_ to_sec                  0.75*** 
                  (0.19) 
                   
N. of obs.  10,826  10,826  10,826  10,826  10,004  10,004  10,004  10,004  20,830 
R
2  29%  29%  29%  29%  39%  39%  39%  39%  35% 
                 
Control Variables
‡                   
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose – general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, 
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector  –  contraction and property, high-tech industry, 
infrastructure, population related services, state, manufacturing and 
transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.   Year fixed effects – 1994 to 2008 
         
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis           
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively       
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request 
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Table 5 
Securitization activity and loan spreads by large banks 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated 
loans by large banks. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. 
Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the 
size of banks total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of banks total abs activity 
between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period. Large loans classified as loans larger than the median loan size.  
  Small loans  Large loans 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
Sec_dum  -56.13***           -14.18***          
  (6.88)        (4.00)       
Sec_dum_all    -35.76***        -12.53***     
    (4.06)        (1.99)     
Sec_rel      -121.45***        -29.23***   
      (17.71)        (8.41)   
Sec_rel_tot        -65.02***        -24.24*** 
        (7.55)        (3.69) 
                 
Num. of obs.  5,966  5,966  5,966  5,966  6,527  6,527  6,527  6,527 
R
2  31%  31%  31%  31%  41%  41%  41%  41% 
               
Control Variables
‡                 
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose –  general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, 
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector – contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, 
population related services, state, manufacturing and transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.   Year fixed effects – 1994 to 2008 
       
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis         
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively     
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request 
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Table 6 
Securitization activity and loan spreads by business cycle 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated loans by business cycle. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any 
assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was active in the securitization market anytime between 1997 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the size of banks 
total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of banks total abs activity between 1997 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period.   
  1997 - 1999  2000 - 2002  2003 - 2006  2007 - 2008 
Sec_dum  -16.8***           -10.6           -56.6***           44.1***          
  (4.49)        (9.53)        (7.67)        (12.4)       
Sec_dum_all    -14.4***        -12.4**        -40.8***        -0.3     
    (2.78)        (5.57)        (5.39)        (6.30)     
Sec_rel      -28.9***        -5.3        -74.9***        53.0**   
      (8.85)        (14.2)        (11.66)        (22.1)   
Sec_rel_tot        -17.0***        -8.2        -52.1***            10.61 
        (4.79)        (8.01)        (6.81)        (7.57) 
                                 
Num. of obs.  7,028  7,028  7,028  7,028  2,427  2,427  2,427  2,427  3,070  3,070  3,070  3,070  2,915  2,915  2,915  2,915 
R
2  29%  29%  29%  29%  44%  44%  44%  44%  42%  42%  42%  42%  33%  33%  33%  33% 
                               
Control Variables
‡                                 
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose – general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, transport finance, corporate control and 
property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector – contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, population related services, state, 
manufacturing and transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.  Year fixed effects – 1997 to 2008 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis,                          
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively                   
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request 
               




Securitization activity and loan spreads for borrowers with and without credit rating 
Impact on loan spreads (basis points of All in Drawn Spread )  
This table presents coefficient estimates for OLS regressions estimating the impact of bank securitization activity on the price of syndicated 
loans by credit banks. Sec_dum takes the value of 1 if the bank securitized any assets in the year when the loan is syndicated and 0 otherwise. 
Sec_dum_all takes the value of 1 if the bank was active in the securitization market anytime between 1994 and 2008 and 0 other. Sec_rel is the 
size of banks total abs activity in the year where the loan is syndicated divided by total assets. Sec_rel_tot is the size of banks total abs activity 
between 1994 and 2008 divided by average assets during this period.   
  Borrowers with a credit rating  Borrowers without a credit rating 
  Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V  Model VI  Model VII  Model VIII 
Sec_dum  -16.7***           -18.4***          
  (4.72)        (4.37)       
Sec_dum_all    -12.5***        -17.0***     
    (2.44)        (2.09)     
Sec_rel      -31.6***        -28.0***   
      (8.07)        (7,78)   
Sec_rel_tot        -22.0***        -18.4*** 
        (4.21)        (3.29) 
                 
Num. of obs.  6,312  6,312  6,312  6,312  14,518  14,518  14,518  14,518 
R
2  53%  53%  53%  53%  31%  31%  31%  31% 
               
Control Variables
‡                 
Bank characteristics 
1.  Log bank size 
2.  Equity capital to total assets 
3.  Loan loss provision to total loans 
4.  Return on assets 
5.  Net loans to total assets 
6.  Liquid assets to total assets 
7.  Other income to total income 
Loan terms and purpose 
8.  Log loan size  
9.  Maturity 
10.  Presence of guarantees 
11.  Presence of collateral 
12.  Loan purpose –  general corporate use, capital structure, project finance, 
transport finance, corporate control and property finance. 
Borrower credit quality and business sector  
13.  Credit rating – AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, BB, CCC, CC, C, and not rated. 
14.  Business Sector – contraction and property, high-tech industry, infrastructure, 
population related services, state, manufacturing and transport.  
Macroeconomic controls 
15.   Year fixed effects – 1994 to 2008 
       
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis         
             ***, ** and * represents significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively     
               ‡
Coefficients are not reported and available upon request 
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Figure 1.a 
TOTAL SECURITIZATION ISSUANCE IN EUROPE  
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Source: European Securitization Forum. 
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Figure 1.b 
RETAINED SECURITISATION IN THE EURO AREA 
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Source: European Securitization Forum. 































up to 3 
years 
Bp over LIBOR  1                            
Equity to total assets  -0.0186  1                         
Loan loss reserves to total loans  0.0685  -0.0021  1                      
ROA  0.0258  0.0062  -0.0243  1                   
Total assets  -0.0606  0.0191  0.1859  -0.03  1                
Net loans to total assets  0.0057  0.0427  -0.5708  -0.0102  -0.198  1             
Liquid assets to total assets  0.0856  0.0197  -0.1255  -0.1314  -0.1047  0.2544  1          
Other income to total income  -0.1054  -0.0406  0.0803  0.1177  0.1129  -0.285  -0.9558  1       
Loan size  0.0817  0.0016  0.0142  0.0111  0.1877  0.0511  0.0492  -0.084  1    
Maturity up to 3 years  -0.353  0.0304  -0.0663  0.0211  0.0503  0.0967  0.0934  -0.1143  0.1383  1 
Maturity between 3 to 6 years  0.0122  -0.0168  0.0451  0.0038  -0.0005  -0.0619  -0.0501  0.0584  -0.0344  -0.1361 
Maturity over 6 years  -0.0908  -0.0086  -0.0356  -0.0001  -0.0306  0.0859  0.0147  -0.0252  -0.0019  0.0337 
Guarantee loan  0.1807  0.0004  -0.0213  -0.0088  -0.002  0.0868  0.0264  -0.0367  -0.0128  -0.0911 
Secured Loan  -0.0941  -0.0036  -0.0145  0.017  0.0112  -0.0043  -0.0592  0.0591  -0.0555  0.0358 
Purpose 1  0.2339  0.0256  -0.0054  0.0622  -0.0356  0.05  -0.0073  -0.0095  -0.033  -0.0941 
Purpose 2  0.234  -0.0005  -0.0022  -0.0047  0.0043  0.1094  0.0788  -0.0966  0.089  -0.0225 
Purpose 3  -0.093  -0.0095  -0.0182  -0.001  -0.0138  0.0548  -0.0101  -0.0005  0.0268  0.1351 
Purpose 4  -0.0508  0.0286  0.0811  -0.023  0.0148  -0.1634  0.0144  0.0144  0.0301  -0.0764 
Purpose 5  0.0596  0.03  -0.0252  0.0221  -0.0017  0.0486  0.0193  -0.0279  -0.0339  -0.0174 
Business sector 1  0.0067  0.0408  -0.0264  -0.012  -0.0169  0.0222  0.0228  -0.0188  -0.0301  -0.0417 
Business sector 2  0.0466  0.0222  0.0146  -0.0057  0.0133  0.0201  0.0339  -0.0386  0.019  -0.01 
Business sector 3  0.028  -0.0018  -0.0052  -0.0212  -0.0283  0.0426  0.0315  -0.028  0.0252  -0.0054 
Business sector 4  0.0783  -0.0218  -0.0031  0.0173  0.0111  0.0453  0.0643  -0.0768  0.0753  -0.0431 
Business sector 5  -0.1681  -0.0072  0.0326  -0.002  0.0277  -0.2135  -0.1158  0.1451  -0.1007  -0.0593 
Business sector 6  0.0078  0.0691  0.0258  -0.012  -0.0128  0.0377  0.0257  -0.0311  -0.0049  -0.0296 
Business sector 7  -0.0579  -0.0195  -0.0107  0.011  0.009  -0.0468  -0.0507  0.0559  -0.0651  0.0689 
Business sector 8  0.0232  -0.0144  0.0037  -0.0043  -0.0373  0.0538  0.0078  -0.015  -0.0002  0.0035 
Business sector 9  0.0538  -0.0066  0.0066  0.0038  -0.0093  0.0502  0.0401  -0.0469  0.0483  0.015 
Credit rating - AAA  0.0835  -0.0062  -0.0418  0.0049  -0.0009  0.0805  0.015  -0.0282  0.0152  0.0978 
Credit rating - AA  -0.0832  -0.0025  -0.0226  -0.0058  -0.0047  0.0278  0.0074  -0.0034  0.0122  0.1001 
Credit rating - A  -0.1342  0.0023  -0.018  -0.0081  0.0127  0.0348  0.0057  -0.005  0.0114  0.1726 
Credit rating - BBB  -0.1907  0.0228  -0.04  -0.0056  -0.0128  0.0885  0.0556  -0.0595  0.0562  0.2365 
Credit rating - BB  -0.125  -0.002  -0.0274  -0.0179  -0.0295  0.0672  0.0307  -0.0297  0.0352  0.1175 
Credit rating - B  0.0916  -0.029  0.0236  0.0033  -0.0443  0.0336  0.0176  -0.0138  0.004  -0.021 
Credit rating - CCC  0.2037  -0.0156  0.0116  0.0033  -0.022  -0.0241  0.004  -0.0048  0.027  -0.0848 
Credit rating - CC  0.0552  -0.0002  -0.017  -0.007  -0.0081  0.0291  0.0017  0.0037  0.0085  -0.0174 
Not rated  0.0177  -0.0025  -0.0028  0.0058  0.0078  0.0091  0.0132  -0.0158  0.01  -0.011   33 


























Maturity between 3 to 6 years  1                            
Maturity over 6 years  -0.3386  1                         
Guarantee loan  -0.2629  -0.4386  1                      
Secured Loan  -0.0006  0.0079  0.0535  1                   
Purpose 1  -0.0993  -0.1147  0.2344  0.0718  1                
Purpose 2  -0.0781  0  0.182  -0.0657  0.0028  1             
Purpose 3  0.0288  0.0867  -0.1063  -0.0015  -0.1315  -0.3629  1          
Purpose 4  0.0909  -0.1079  -0.2093  -0.0551  -0.0036  -0.2625  -0.3967  1       
Purpose 5  -0.0813  -0.1012  0.307  0.1237  0.4411  -0.1348  -0.2037  -0.1473  1    
Business sector 1  0.019  -0.0079  0.0259  -0.0111  -0.0058  -0.0347  -0.0524  -0.0379  -0.0195  1 
Business sector 2  -0.0578  0.0305  0.0995  0.0079  0.0039  0.147  -0.0223  -0.056  0.0032  0.0015 
Business sector 3  -0.0084  0.0397  0.0064  0.0185  -0.007  0.0329  0.0522  -0.0541  -0.0418  -0.0152 
Business sector 4  -0.0491  0.0242  0.113  -0.0039  0.0372  0.1256  -0.0065  -0.1002  -0.0529  0.0172 
Business sector 5  0.1501  -0.1268  -0.2771  -0.0726  -0.1346  -0.2511  -0.0147  0.2605  -0.1582  0.0398 
Business sector 6  -0.0297  0.0525  -0.011  0.0171  -0.0166  0.0583  0.0253  -0.033  -0.044  -0.0091 
Business sector 7  0.0142  0.05  -0.0202  -0.007  -0.0612  -0.076  -0.0073  -0.034  -0.001  -0.0112 
Business sector 8  -0.0185  0.0589  -0.0133  0.0103  0.0198  0.0246  0.0519  -0.0514  -0.0173  -0.0121 
Business sector 9  -0.0446  0.0462  0.019  -0.0157  -0.0181  0.1519  0.0142  -0.0578  -0.0695  -0.012 
Credit rating - AAA  -0.0612  -0.0237  0.1586  0.001  0.0846  0.0076  0.0175  -0.0644  0.1298  -0.019 
Credit rating - AA  -0.024  -0.0068  -0.0266  -0.0046  -0.0353  -0.0281  0.0292  -0.0063  -0.0231  -0.006 
Credit rating - A  -0.0393  -0.0076  -0.0355  -0.0032  -0.0871  -0.0477  0.093  -0.0196  -0.0394  -0.0108 
Credit rating - BBB  -0.0083  0.0366  -0.1165  0.0103  -0.1256  -0.0081  0.0867  -0.0045  -0.0614  -0.0102 
Credit rating - BB  0.0461  0.0569  -0.1128  -0.0462  -0.1176  -0.0468  0.0553  0.0407  -0.0735  -0.0206 
Credit rating - B  0.0721  0.0208  -0.0202  -0.0446  0.0467  0.0041  0.0596  0.0201  -0.0539  -0.0188 
Credit rating - CCC  -0.0008  -0.0218  -0.0269  -0.0533  0.0912  -0.0033  0.0456  0.0494  -0.0578  -0.0017 
Credit rating - CC  0.0176  -0.0108  0.0064  0.0058  0.0475  -0.0026  0.0079  -0.0056  0.0047  -0.0031 
Not rated  0.0096  0.0077  -0.009  0.0249  0.0112  -0.0076  0.008  0.0066  -0.0043  -0.0011 
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Business sector 2  1                                                 
Business sector 3  -0.0715  1                                              
Business sector 4  -0.1242  -0.0803  1                                           
Business sector 5  -0.2301  -0.1488  -0.2585  1                                        
Business sector 6  -0.0609  -0.0394  -0.0684  -0.1267  1                                     
Business sector 7  -0.0526  -0.034  -0.0591  -0.1095  -0.029  1                                  
Business sector 8  -0.0566  -0.0366  -0.0636  -0.1177  -0.0312  -0.0269  1                               
Business sector 9  -0.1018  -0.0659  -0.1144  -0.2119  -0.0561  -0.0485  -0.0521  1                            
Credit rating - AAA  -0.1104  -0.0714  -0.124  -0.2297  -0.0608  -0.0525  -0.0565  -0.1016  1                         
Credit rating - AA  -0.0279  -0.0069  -0.0261  0.0292  -0.0154  0.0091  -0.0108  0.0462  -0.0125  1                      
Credit rating - A  -0.0355  -0.0155  -0.0323  0.0153  0.0012  0.1242  -0.0142  0.034  -0.002  -0.0128  1                   
Credit rating - BBB  -0.0251  0.0169  -0.0513  0.019  0.0614  0.0194  0.017  0.0197  -0.0418  -0.022  -0.0399  1                
Credit rating - BB  -0.009  0.0257  -0.0405  -0.0646  0.0086  0.1063  0.0223  -0.003  -0.0213  -0.0244  -0.0442  -0.076  1             
Credit rating - B  0.0258  0.025  0.0181  -0.0475  0.0105  0.0058  0.0042  0.0026  0.0262  -0.0223  -0.0404  -0.0695  -0.0769  1          
Credit rating - CCC  -0.019  0.0148  -0.0122  0.0496  -0.0233  -0.0183  0.008  -0.0039  0.0346  -0.0219  -0.0397  -0.0683  -0.0756  -0.0691  1       
Credit rating - CC  0.0069  -0.0043  -0.0067  -0.0215  -0.0081  -0.007  0.0055  -0.0136  0.0505  -0.0037  -0.0068  -0.0116  -0.0129  -0.0118  -0.0116  1    
Not rated  -0.0052  -0.0033  0.0415  -0.0107  -0.0028  -0.0025  -0.0026  -0.0047  -0.0051  -0.0013  -0.0024  -0.0041  -0.0045  -0.0041  -0.004  -0.0007  1 
 